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INTRODUCTION
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The desire for low-cost reliable computing is increasing. Most current fault tolerant com-
puting solutions are not very flexible, i.e., they cannot adapt to reliability requirements of newly
emerging applications in business, commerce, and manufacturing. It is important that users
have a flexible, reliable platform to support both critical and noncritical applications.
Chameleon [9], currently under development at the Center for Reliable and High-Perform-
ance Computing at the University of Illinois, is a software framework for supporting cost-
effective, adaptable, networked fault tolerant service. Because of a desire for efficiency and
adaptability, the Chameleon architecture is intended to support heterogeneity and scalability.
Scalability here implies physical scalability, resource scalability, and fault tolerance scalability.
During the design of such complex systems as Chameleon, there is a need to validate the
capabilities and measure the performance of the system. This can be done through analytical
methods, experimentation, or simulation. Once a functional architecture is defined, simulation
is often the most viable of these options. No working version of the system is necessary, and it
I
allows for a more complex model of the system than mathematical analysis.
In the case of Chameleon, we are interested in analyzing the effectiveness of different types
of fault detection and recovery strategies. We are also interested in measuring the overhead
incurred by the fault detection and recovery mechanisms. These measurements will allow deci-
sionsto be madeabout whichrecoverystrategiesshouldbeusedin the.actualimplementation
of Chameleon.
Thegoalof this thesisis to givea detaileddescriptionoftheeffortsto simulatefault injection,
detection,and recoveryin Chameleon,and of the resultsobtainedfrom this simulation.This
thesisis divided into sevenchapters.The secondchapterdiscussesrelatedwork in the areaof
distributedand rehablecomputing.The third chaptergivesa generaloverviewof Chameleon
and its components.The fourth chapterdescribesthe simulation.Chapter5 givesa detailed
descriptionof the fault injection,detection,and recoverystrategiesthat havebeensimulated.
Theexperimentalresultsobtainedfrom the simulationaredescribedthesixth chapter,andthe
conclusionis givenin thefinal chapter.
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Current approm:hes to designing reliable networked computing environments from unreli-
able components are based primarily on taking advantage of distributed groups of cooperating
processes. Most of these designs require a specialized, complex software layer that must be
installed on each participating computation node. Several of these systems are focused on pro-
viding a software environment designed to handle distributed applications. Several of these
approaches are discussed in this chapterJ
Isis [2] provides tools for managing and programming with process groups. Using these
tools allows a programmer to construct group-based software that provides reliability through
explicit replication of code and data.
Transis [6] is a multicast communication layer that enables the creation and execution of
fault tolerant distributed applications in a networked environment. It supports reliable group
communication for high-availability applications. Transis allows partitionable operation with
the ability to reliably merge components when recovering.
Horus [18] also uses the group communication paradigm. It provides a framework for de-
signing distributed applications at a minimal cost. The Horus tool can be used to aid in the
construction of reliable services. It is a newer generation of the Isis toolkit.
m
J
1Cristian [4] provides more detail about the concepts behind distributed fault tolerant systems. Birman [1]
discusses group communications and numerous existing fault tolerant distributed systems in more detail.
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The systems outlined above are primarily concerned with the group processing paradigm
rather than being particularly geared toward fault tolerance. A few systems described below
did place a primary emphasis on fault tolerant and/or highly available computing.
Delta-4 [13] was one of the earlier efforts to build a dependable distributed system. It used
an open arcKitecture in which a trusted module was loaded on each participating host to execute
a multipoint communication protocol. The protocol was used to coordinate process groups,
process errors, and perform fault treatment. Delta-4 also required a specialized hardware
network adaptor card to guarantee proper fail-silent behavior.
Some aspects of service availability are addressed in the Piranha [10] tool. Piranha acts
as a fault tolerant process manager, exploiting the dynamic replication of objects to achieve
high availability. It is designed to be a CORBA-based application-restart service and monitor.
Piranha addresses needs for heterogeneity, interoperability, extensibility, and availability by
making use of CORBA's Interface Description Language.
The Wolfpack [11] system from Microsoft® provides clustering extensions to Windows
NT® for improving service availability and system scalability. Issues intended to be addressed
in future versions of Wolfpack include distributed applications4 higher performance intercon-
nects, distributed storage, and load balancing.
At Sun Microsystems, work has been done on Ultra Enterprise Clusters [16], designed to
provide highly available data services. The Ultra Enterprise Cluster High Availability 1.3
server provides automatic, software-based fault detection and recovery mechanisms. Specialized
software allows a set of two computing nodes to monitor each other and redirect data requests
in the case of a software or hardware failure.
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ServerNet [8] from Tandem Computers is a system area network designed to support reliable,
efficient communications. It provides a combination hardware/software layer on which fault
tolerant systems can be built. ServerNet is flexible in that the routers in the system can be
configured in several different topologies. Error detection and recovery are also provided in
the form of checksums on messages andan access validation and translation table for memory
requests.
The systems described here that explicitly address fault detection and recovery each require
a specialized and complex software layer and, in some cases, additional hardware. Also, many of
the systems described above provide an environment for constructing distributed applications.
Chameleon, on the other hand, explicitly provides fault tolerance through a wide range of error
detection and recovery mechanisms. Not all of these systems have such explicit mechanisms,
and many rely only on timeouts.
v
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CHAPTER 3
CHAMELEON FRAMEWORK
3.1 Overview
Chameleon (Figure 3.1) is a network-based infrastructure with the capability of adapting to
application-specific availability requirements. Primary issues addressed in designing Chameleon
include efficient and rapid error detection and recovery techniques which provide a basis for
implementing fault tolerance strategies required by each user application.
FAULT TOLERANCE
MANAGER
-mapping thenetwork
-invokingthedaemons
-determingfaultolerance
strategy
-generatingagents and
Figure 3.1 Chameleon: A reliable, networked computing environment (this figure is taken
from Iyer, et. al. [9]). ._
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vTo achieve these goals, Chameleon uses several specialized software components. These com-
ponents include: (1) Fault Tolerance Manager (FTM), a specialized independent and intelligent
entity capable of establishing an appropriate fault tolerance strategy complying to the required
level of dependability for a given user request, (2) Reliable, Mobile, and Intelligent Agents
capable of migrating through the networked environment and operating independently on be-
half of the FTM according to built-in specifications and instructions, (3) Surrogate Managers
operating as pseudomanagers for particular applications, capable supporting proper commu-
nications with the agents, which guard against faulty behavior of the application's execution
on remote hosts, (4) Host Daemons residing on each node (throughout this thesis, the words
node and host will be used interchangeably to refer to a machine participating in the reliable
networked environment) and responsible for handshaldng with the agents and managers and
monitoring their behavior, and (5) Software Libraries providing basic building blocks to create
or re-engineer agents. The goal of the system is to prevent any single point of failure from
compromising the entire system.
The Chameleon implementation does not use a specialized language framework, rather it
is based on Widely available scripting languages, such as TCL, and high-level programming
languages, such as C÷÷. The goal is to provide a relatively thin software layer, which must
be present in each machine in the structure. It should be noted that nothing prevents using
a framework, such as C ORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture) [12], for imple-
menting some of the features of Chameleon. It is believed, however, that an implementation
with CORBA, while providing for easie r interoperability between processes executing on differ-
ent machines in a heterogeneous environment, will increase Chameleon's complexity, at least
in terms of the software that must be pre-installed on each node in the system. Chameleon
attempts to maintain simplicity by allowingthe userto developthe applicationin a regular
fashionand to executeit with the user'sdesiredlevelof dependability.
As describedin Chapter2, mostof thecurrentapproachesusedin distributedcomputations
requirea specialized,complexsoftwarelayerthat mustbe installedin eachcomputationnode,
e.g.,sophisticatedand complexunderlyingprotocolsfor supportinga groupmembershipand
• atomicbroadcast. Becausea primary objectiveof developingthesesystemsis to providea
softwareenvironmentfor executingdistributedapplications,the serviceavailability issue is
not often considered to be critical. Consequently, there is no dedicated mechanism for error
detection, and the fault tolerance is somewhat a side effect of the use of the group communication
approach. The system usually relies on error detection that is based on capturing the timeout
in a response from one of processes in the group.
3.2 Components of Chameleon
The five main components of Chameleon, as stated above, are described in more detail
in this section. Each component's responsibilities, modes of operation, and communication
patterns are discussed. Table 3.1 gives a brief summary of the main components.
3.2.1 Fault Tolerance Manager
The Fault Tolerance Manager (FTM) is the component of Chameleon that is responsible
for interfacing between the user and the system internals. The FTM has four main functions:
(1) mapping the network, i.e., identifying the network configuration and collecting information
about the nodes in the system. The FTM maintains an internal data structure that contains
. I
this data and is updated when nodes are'added to or removed from the system, (2) invoking a
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Agent Library
Component Task Recovery
Fault Tolerance Manager Oversees execution environment Sar.kup FTM
(FTM) takes over
Agent Implements specific techniques Host daemon
providing application-required notifies surrogate
dependability manager
Surrogate Manager Oversees execution of a particular Host daemon
application notifies FTM
Host Daemon Provides Communication gateway to Heartbeat agent
agents and makes resources at a host notifies FTM
available to the Chameleon environment
N/XProvides predefined agents and
agent building blo_s
Table 3.1 Chameleon system components, their tasks, and recovery mechanisms:
daemon process on each node in the network to support communication with the FTM, (3) col-
lecting information about applications from users, and (4) determining fault tolerance strategies
to allow the application to execute at the required level of dependability. The FTM's decision
may be based on a history of failures in the system as well as on application requirements.
Detection and recovery techniques are taken from the agent libraries to construct the agents
necessary to implement the chosen fault tolerance strategy.
In the initialization phase, the FTM collects information about 'the system configuration
and characteristics of individual nodes, such as type of architecture( operating system, size of
the RAM, etc. Initialization agents are sent to the hosts to obtain this data and to install the
host daemons on participating machines. After successful initialization, Chameleon is ready to
accept user requests. ..
When a user request arrives, the FTM designates a query agent to acquire the necessary
information on the application specifics, such as the required availability level, needed system
resources, type of results, etc. Based on information collected about the application, the FTM
can identify the necessaryfault tolerancestrategyand candesignatea set of agents to initiate
and monitor the application. Creation of agents is performed according to a predefined pro-
cedure that uses two software libraries: (1) a library of building blocks and (2) a library of
agents. The FTM may create new agents from the basic building blocks or may re-engineer
already existing agents to extend their functions. Agents designated to support the applica-
tion's execution migrate through the network to the selected nodes and initiate the application's
execution. One of the designated agents is resident in FTM and is responsible for supporting
proper communications with the agents that monitor the application on the remote hosts. To
ensure a rapid reaction to the application's failures, the application is watched by the agent
that evoked it. The agent communicates to the FTM any detectable application misbehavior.
As the agent itself may fail, it is watched by the host daemon, which is capable of notifying
the FTM about agent failures. The FTM can regenerate a new agent either to complete or to
restart the application (if the application failed). It should be emphasized that agents, once
generated, can act autonomously, and the FTM is free to serve other user requests. In order
to detect node failures, the FTM uses heartbeat messages, which are sent with a predefined
frequency. In the case of node failure, the application(s) executed on the node are migrated to
other available nodes. To operate reliably, the FTM must be resilient to errors. Consequently
it must provide a sufficient level of redundancy to cope with errors. To handle FTM failures, a
backup FTM is used. The role of the backup FTM is to periodically send a heartbeat to the
FTM to determine whether it is alive. In the case of an FTM failure, the backup FTM has the
capability to act as the FTM until the primary FTM can be recovered.
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3.2.2 Reliable, Mobile Agents
The agents in Chameleon are designed as fault resilient carriers of information to and i_om
the FTM and other managing entities. They are designated by their manager to perform
the actions and operations needed, for successful completion of an application, while adhering
to the user's needs for dependability. Each agent is designed to be sufficiently intelligent to
execute specified functions in an autonomous fashion. This autonomous nature of the agents
aids in offioading much of the processing from the FTM. This decreasing of the burden on the
FTM enables the FTM to concentrate on its primary tasks as described above. The primary
characteristics of agents axe (1) mobility, (2) reliability, and (3) scalability.
Mobility: Agents migrate through Chameleon's network in order to accomplish their tasks
as defined by their manager. Well-known communication protocols such as TCP/IP can be
used to support this mobility.
Reliability: It is imperative that agents are resilient to network and node failures. To
achieve this, the agent code in the existing agent libraries is tested rigorously against erroneous
execution. It is also important to ensure that a failure in the agent does not cause a crash of
the application it was in charge of executing and that the agent's crash does not propagate out
of the node on which the agent currently resides. To prevent such behavior, agents are watched
by host daemons. The host daemon is notified which agents it will have to monitor for possible
crashes when each agent is installed on its host. If an agent fails, the daemon notifies the
agent's manager. To protect the agent from corruption in the network it and its transmissions
are guarded with a checksum.
Scalability: It is simple to create or re-engineer agents using elementary building blocks
or already existing agents. Chameleon provides a unified, general framework for creating
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newagents or extending functions of already= existing agents, e.g., the user might provide an
application-specific detection mechanism to be incorporated into an agent. Two basic software
libraries support this approach: (1) a library of building primitives and (2) a library of agents.
These libraries are discussed in more detail below.
3.2.3 Surrogate Managers
A surrogate manager is spawned by the FTM after the required fault tolerance configuration
has been determined. It is created using a procedure similar to the one employed for creating
agents. Each surrogate manager is associated with an application (or possibly several applica-
tions may share the same surrogate manager). The surrogate manager can be seen either as a
"super agent" or pseudomanager. It is capable of acting as a regular agent, e.g., it can travel
through the network to the designated nodes, and it is recognized and monitored by the host
L
daemon. At the same time, it is capable of operating as a manager, i.e., it supervises agents
designated to control the application, and it can regenerate agents that failed during operation.
To facilitate autonomous and independent operation of the surrogate manager, a portion of the
system information maintained by the FTM is also kept with the surrogate manager. By this
means, the application can survive even in the case of FTM failure. The system information
that must be available to the surrogate manager includes full specification of the application
and access to the software libraries used to create and re-engineer the agents.
3.2.4 Host Daemons
The host daemons are entities at each of the hosts which are responsible for handling
communication between agents, surrogate managers, and the FTM. The daemon processes
-- - . L
are responsible for accepting and installing any agents sent to their host; they interact with
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the agents to accomplish their task. The daemon processes have the intelligence to recognize
the type of agent' being sent over, and they have a well-defined handshaking protocol for
communicating with each of the agents. The daemon process is also responsible for monitoring
the behavior o£ agents and surrogate managers. When the host daemon detects a malfunctioning
agent, it notifies the agent's manager. In the case of an error encountered in a surrogate
manager, the FTM is notified directly of the failure. The manager of the malfunctioning
component then sends over a clone of the agent or surrogate manager to the host on which the
erroneous behavior occurred (alternately, a new host could be chosen for the regenerated agent
or manager). The new agent/manager becomes a part of the process to complete the execution
of the application in the mode defined by the FTM.
• i
3.2.5 Agent Libraries
The agent libraries are used to construct different types of agents for executing user requests
in the required mode of dependability. There are two distinct libraries for agents: the library
of building blocks and the hbrary of agents. The agent building-block library contains basic
building blocks used to implement the different types of agents required by Chameleon. The
library of agents contains already constructed agents ready for use by the FTR/I.
The library of building blocks contains micro- and macro-operations for supporting ap-
plication execution in the distributed environment. Agents can be created, modified, and re-
engineered using these operations. These operations may include capabilities such as installing
a user application, comparing two or more results files, or notifying another component of a
specific event (e.g., an application failure).
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The library of agents contains hierarchically arranged, already available agents, which have
the flexibility of extension: (1) basic agents, (2) agents extended from the basic agents using
primitive building blocks, (3) complex agents derived from the combination of existing agents,
and (4) user--defined agents from existing or user-defined building blocks.
i_ 3.3 Fault Tolerance Strategies
Once the FTM has decided to run an apphcation using a particular fault tolerance strategy,
the Set of agents and an associated surrogate manager are invoked to set up the environment to
support the selected strategy (e.g., triple modular redundant mode). The surrogate manager
takes over management of the application from this point, and the agents begin their duty
of installing, executing, and monitoring the application. When the application completes, the
agents are responsible for notifying the surrogate manager of the final results.
There are five predefined modes of application execution: single machine With no recovery,
single machine with recovery, duphcated execution, triple modular redundant execution, and
quad execution. Each of these is outlined below.
In single machine with no recovery mode, the user application is run on a single node with
no special recovery steps taken in the event of failure. This mode is the least reliable of the
predefined modes Of execution.
Single machine with recovery mode also executes the application on a single system node,
but it provides recovery in the event of application failure. This recovery includes restarting
the application (possibly from a checkpoint) in the event of abnormal application termination.
The monitoring and restarting is performed by a specialized execution agent.
• In duplicated execution mode, the user application is executed concurrently on two separate
machines. When results are obtained from each application, they are compared by a specialized
voter agent. If the voter agent finds a discrepancy between the two results, it notifies the
surrogate manager that the application failed; otherwise, the application is considered to have
completed successfully.
In triple modular redundant mode, the application is executed on three separate machines,
with the results compared by a voter agent when all execution has completed.
Quad execution mode provides the highest level of dependability of the predefined execution
modes. The application is run on four nodes as two sets of duplicated applications. Each set
has a voter agent, which compares the results of the two applications. If no discrepancies are
found, another voter agent compares the results from these two voters and notifies the surrogate
manager of the results.
3.4 An Example Application
This section describes the steps taken to execute a user application in duplicated execution
mode. The figures below provide a graphical portrayal of this process. It is assumed that all
initialization has completed at the beginning of the application's execution.
Figure 3.2 shows the processing of the user request. The FTM is notified of the request and
sends a query agent to the user's machine to obtain information about the request. The query
agent is installed on the user's machine and collects in.formation about the application from the
user. The query agent then returns with the query results and application code to the FTM.
Figure 3.3 portrays the selection of fault tolerance strategy by the FTM and the installation
of the appropriate agents and associated surrogate manager. In this case, the FTM has chosen
15
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Figure 3:2 User communication mad query agent.
to execute the apphcation in duplicated execution mode, as described above. The FTM is
responsible for retrieving and/or constructing the proper agents from the agent libraries. Each
host daemon receives, installs, and initiates execution of its incoming agent or manager. It is
worthwhile to note that the user's host need not be a part of the execution environment.
The application installation and execution is depicted in Figure 3.4. Once the execution
agents have been installed, they request the application code from the FTM. After recei:cing
this code, it is compiled by the agent and executed. During the execution, the application-
is periodically monitored by the agent, which is in turn periodically monitored by the host
daemon,
When the applications have completed, the sequence of events shown in Figure 3.5 Occurs.
The results from each application are sent to the voter agent. Once all results have been
16
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Figure 3.3 Agent and surrogate manager installation.
obtained by the voter agent, a comparison is done. This comparison may check for an exact
-match, or it may check that the differences lie within an allowable range as specified by the
user to the query agent at the beginning of the user request. After a successful comparison,
results are sent by the voter agent to the surrogate manager, which in turn sends them to the
FTM. When the FTM receives the results of the application, it notifies the user and sends and
recursively uninstalls the surrogate manager and its agents. (Recursive uninstallation means
that each manager uninstalls those entities directly under its command, e.g., in under duplicated
execution, the FTM uniustalls the surrogate manager, and the surrogate manager uninstalls
the two execution agents and the voter agent.)
The scenario described above does not show system behavior under failures. A similar
scenario detailing the steps taken to detect and recover from a failure is detailed in Chapter 5.
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3.5 Summary .
Chameleon provides an environment for efficient creation and execution of dependable ap-
plications. It provides various mechanisms to detect and recover from failures in a dynamically
changing networked environment. Chameleon allows for applications with varying dependabil-
ity requirements to be efficiently executed on the same reliable networked platform using an
applicatiom-specific fault tolerance strategy for each user-submitted application.
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CHAPTER 4
SIMULATION OF CHAMELEON
4.1 Overview
A simulation has been constructed to model the Chameleon system. The simulation models
the behavior of the FTM, host daemons, surrogate managers, and agents and their interac-
tions. The goal of the simulation is to obtain information about the effect of fault tolerance
detection and recovery strategies in terms of fault coverage and performance degradation. This
information can in turn be used to guide the implementation of Chameleon. The simulation
was written in DEPEND [7], a functional, process-based simulation tool. DEPEND was chosen
particularly for its emphasis on modeling fault tolerant systems.
4.2 DEPEND
DEPEND is a simulation-based CAD environment built on top of CSIM [15] that helps
computer systems designers study the behavior of a system in detail. DEPEND is designed to
be a joint performability and dependability analysis tool. DEPEND provides an object-oriented
C÷÷-based framework which allows for the evaluation of dependable computer systems. The
tool provides facilities to model components often found in fault tolerant systems and allows for
automated fault injection. By an acceleration technique, DEPEND allows its users to obtain a
detailed and statistically valid dependability analysis of a given system.
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The methodology of DEPEND is a three-level hierarchy. Simulation objects axe used to de-
scribe models. Process entities in each of these simulation objects represent schedulable units.
Finally, simulation constructs in each of the processes provide for communication, synchroniza-
tion, and resource allocation.
DEPEND is a hybrid simulation engine, taking advantage of the flexibility of process-based
simulation and the speed of event-based simulation. Compiler-based techniques are used to
translate from a process-based model to a hybrid process-based/event--driven model to increase
simulation speed. Pr0cess-based techniques are used because process interaction is generally a
better model of system behavior.
DEPEND supplies a library of C++ objects that simulate the functional behavior of com-
ponents often found in fault tolerant systems. These objects also inject faults, initiate repairs,
compile statistics, and generate reports. To use DEPEND, a user writes a control program in
C+÷ With the objects provided by DEPEND. The program is then compiled and linked with
DEPEND objects and the run-time environment. The model can then be executed in a simu-
lated parallel environment. In this environment, all objects execute simultaneously to simulate
the functional behavior of the architecture.
4.3 Simulated System Description
The system being modeled by this simulation consists of eleven hosts (one host dedicated to
the FTM). Each host is simulated as having a single processor with a round-robin scheduling
policy with a specified time slice. The hosts are attached to a Myrinet switch [3] through which
all communication takes place.
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Figure 4.1 Class hierarchy of simulated Chameleon components.
Data Structures
The major data structures used in the simulation are C++ classes modeling the main
components of Chameleon. All major Chameleon components except as the host data structure
are derived from the Agent base class. The class hierarchy is depicted in Figure 4.1. The
host class, not shown, is derived from the FT_server class in the DEPEND class library. This
hierarchical design of the simulation allows for new types of agents or other simulated Chameleon
constructs to be integrated into the simulation code relatively easily.
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4.4.1 Agent Classes
The Agent base class includes methods common to nearly all the system components, such
as a message sending method, a message processing method, an execute method, and fault
injection methods.
Three types of agents are modeled in the simulation: the execution agent, the heartbeat
agent, and the voter agent. Neither the heartbeat agent nor the voter agent have any additional
methods; the methods from the Agent base class are simply specialized for the behavior of
the agents. The execution agent has One additional method, which allows it to monitor its
application. Each of the inherited methods is also specialized for the execution agent.
4.4.2 Manager Classes
The Manager class is derived from the Agent class. Additional functionality of the Manager
class includes the ability to maintain lists of hosts and agents associated with the manager and
the ability to install and uninstall agents. Additional message-processing capabilities are also
included.
The host daemon and FTM classes are both derived from the Manager base class. Additional
methods used by the daemon class include those to monitor for incoming messages, to dispatch
messages to the appropriate agents, and to monitor the agents residing on the daemon's host.
The FTM's class has an additional method to process incoming user requests, as well as methods
. 7 7" i
to execute the requests using the proper fault tolerance strategy.
23
4.4.3 Surrogate Manager Classes
The SurrogateManagerclassis derivedfrom the Managerclass. Additional functionality
includesthe ability to processmoretypesof messagesthan the Managerbaseclass.Both the
replicatedsurrogate"managerclass(usedfor executingapplications in duplicatedmodeand
TMR mode)and the quadsurrogatemanagerclass(usedfor executingapplicationsin quad
mode)are derived from the base SurrogateManager class. Each one has its inherited methods
specialized to perform its designated tasks.
4.5 Simulation Behavior
The simulation need not simulate all behavior of Chameleon. It is only useful to simulate
behavior related to the measurements the simulation will provide. Failure to abstract away
some system behavior could cause significant performance degradation in the simulation. The
initialization procedure (i.e., the handshaking procedure to install a daemon and register a host
. L
with the FTM) was not modeled in the simulation, as it only affects the system startup cost and
not the execution of user requests. Also, actual execution of code is not simulated. Only the
use of a host's processor is simulated. The simulation concentrates on system-level behavior
rather than modeling the program counter, caches, etc., on each host.
Only three modes of execution are simulated: duplicated, TMR, and quad mode. These are
the modes that require the most overhead and are the most interesting for the results obtained
T
in this thesis. All agents are assumed to exist in the agent library, no user-specified agents have
been simulated, and agents are never built from building blocks in the simulation.
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CHAPTER 5
FAULT HANDLING IN THE SIMULATION
5.1 Overview
To see how Chameleon handles failures it was necessary to simulate f_ilures to various
components during execution of the simulation. There are three main parts to the failure
process: fault injection, fault detection, and fault recovery. This chapter provides a detailed
description of the injection, detection, and recovery strategies used for each of the simulated
components.
Table 5.1 briefly summarizes the detection and recovery process required for each component
into which faults are. injected in the simulation. This is discussed in more detail below.
5.2 Fault Injection Strategy
Fault injection in the simulation is implemented using the DEPEND fault injector object.
The components that may fail are: Hosts, Execution Agents, Voter Agents, Heartbeat Agents,
Surrogate Managers, User Applications, and the FTM. Each instantiated object of these types
has an internal fault injector, which is started at the time the component begins executing. For
each component, faults are assumed to occur according to an exponential distribution.
The fault injection strategies for the different components are very similar. All faults injected
are permanent and fail-silent, with the exception of faults in the FTM, which are transient and
_ 25
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Execution Agent
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Table 5.1 Simulated fault injections, detections, and recoveries. w
fail-silent. Permanent failures are failures that exist indefinitely until some corrective action is
taken. Transient failures exist only for short periods of time. A fail-silent fault is one in which
the failed compone_n t stops communicating with other components rather than continuing to
send possibly faulty communications.
A faultinjected into a host in this system will cause the host to become unreachable, and all
applications executing on that host will terminate and be lost. A fault injected into any agent
or manager will cause execution of that component to terminate, and it will be incapable of
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receivingor sendinganysort of communication.A userapplicationthat failswill immediately
stopexecutingandwill produceno results.
Onecomponentintowhichfaultsarenot injectedis thehostdaemon.Thereasoningbehind
this is that hostdaemonfailureshavethe sameeffectasnodefailuresandarehandledin the
samefashionasnodefailures.A failedhostdaemonpreventsits hostfromreceivingor sending
Chameleon-relatedcommunications.
5.3 Fault Detection Strategies
Chameleon has several built-in failure-detection capabilities to cover the different compo-
nents that may fail. This section describes how each type of failure is detected in the simulation.
D
i
5.3.1 Agent
To detect agent failures for each type of agent, the daemon residing on that agent's host
periodically polls each agent to see whether it is still ahve. This is meant to simulate a process
table lookup or something similar. It is simulated by checking a field in the agent class indicating
whether the agent is alive. If the daemon determines the agent is no longer alive, it removes the
agent from its list of agents to monitor-and sends a message to the agent's manager (surrogate
manager or FTM) indicating the failure. This polling method is used rather than attempting to
capture signals because it can be used to simulate detection of failures hke livelock (by checking
the process's program counter) as well as abnonnal termination failures.
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5.3.2 Surrogate Manager
Detectionof failuresin asurrogatemanagerismuchthesameasdetectionof agentfailures.
Eachsurrogatemanagerispolledperiodicallyby theresidenthostdaemon.Whenthe daemon
detectsa failure,it sendsa notificationmessageto the FTM.
5.3.3 User Application
To detectfailures in.the userapplication,the applicationis periodicallymonitoredby its
executionagentin muchthe samewayagentsare monitoredby the residenthost daemons.
Whena userapplicationhasfailed,theexecutionagentsendsa messagealerting the surrogate
managerOfthe failure.
5.3.4 Host
To detecthost failures,a heartbeatagentresideson the samehostasthe FTM and peri-
odicallysendsheartbeatmessagesto all hostsregisteredwith the FTM. Eachhost is expected
to r_p0n d tQ_ heartbeatwithin the definedheartbeat timeout interval--Sincea failed:host
is incapableof communicating,it will not respondto heartbeatmessages.Oncea heartbeat
timeout is detected,the agentstopssendingheartbeatsto that host and notifiesthe FTM of
the failedhost.
5.3.5 FTM
Implementationof failuresin the FTM wasdonequite differentlyfrom the other failure
detection and recovery mechanisms. Several methods for detecting FTM failures have been
conceived, such as running the FTM in triple modular redundant mode, having a backup FTM
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which is alerted of updates to the primary FTM's data structures, and executing the FTM on a
dedicated, highly reliable computation node. None of these was implemented in the simulation.
Instead, when a failure occurs in the. FTM, detection is assumed to occur after a random
amount of time (based on an exponential distribution), and the FTM recovers after that time.
Essentially, FTM failures are modeled as transient failures.
This transient failure model is used for the FTM because, at the time the simulation results
were taken, the detection and recovery for the FTM in the Chameleon implementation had not
yet been established. The transient model should be sufficient to examine the effects to the
system when the FTM fails, however that failure may be handled.
5.4 Fault Recovery Strategies
z
m
w
Once a failure has been detected using the methods described above, the next step is to
recover from the failure. Chameleon has the capability to recover from each of the faults injected
in the simulation. These recovery techniques are described below. There is no subsection for
the Fault Tolerance Manager in this section because of the transient nature of its faults.
5.4.1 Execution Agent
When an execution agent fails, its surrogate manager is responsible for its recovery. Once
the surrogate manager receives a failure notification from the agent's resident daemon, it uses
information it has about the failed agent to reconstruct a new execution agent. The surrogate
manager must maintain information about the voter to the execution agent sends its results
and the application which the execution agent was monitoring. It then installs this new agent
z i l
on the same host and sends it the application to be restarted. Once the new execution agent is
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installedand running, a message is sent to its voter notifying it of the new agent from which it
should expect results. m
5.4.2 Heartbeat Agent
The FTM is the entity responsible for recovering a failed heartbeat agent. Once the FTM
is notified about the failure, it reconstructs a new heartbeat agent. The FTM provides the new
heartbeat agent with its list of registered hosts. Once the agent has been reconstructed with
this information, it is installed and begins sending heartbeats to the hosts provided to it by the
FTM.
5.4.3 Voter Agent
When a voter agent fails, its surrogate manager is responsible for its recovery. Once the
surrogate manager receives a failure notification from the agent's resident daemon, it uses
information it has about the failed agent to reconstruct a new voter agent. The surrogate
manager must maintain information about the entity to which the voter agent was intended to
send its results (the surrogate manager itself, or possibly another voter agent) and the agents
from which the voter agent expected to receive results. It then installs this new agent on the
same host. The destination entity for the new voter's results (in the case that it is not the
surrogate manager itself) is then notified of the new source by the surrogate manager.
Once the voter agent has been installed, it sends a message to each of the agents on whose
results it is voting, instructing them of the new destination for their results. Upon receiving
this message, an agent will send its results, if they have already been computed, as well as
updating its destination agent. This allows the voter to recover any results sent during the
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period between when .the fault occurred and recovery completed, or to immediately receive any
results the failed voter had already received.
5.4.4 Surrogate Manager
In the case of a surrogate manager's failure, the FTM is responsible for its recovery. Once the
FTM has received a notification of the failure, it reconstructs the surrogate manager, providing
it with the list of agents the failed manager was overseeing and the expected communications
flow between the agents (which agent s expect results from which other agents). When the
reconstruction is complete, the surrogate manager is installed on the host on that the failed
one was running. After installation, the new manager sends a request to its primary voter (the
voter which sends its results to the surrogate manager) to send any results it has. As with voter
agent recovery, if the primary voter has not computed results yet, it ignores the request.
In the special case that the surrogate manager was in the process of overseeing the instal-
lation of its agents when it failed, a new surrogate manager is created from scratch. All agents
whose installation had completed under the failed surrogate manager are then uninstalled by
the FTM.
5.4.5 User Application
In the case of a user application's failure, the execution agent is in charge of recovery.
Once the failure is detected by the execution agentl it sends a message to notify the surrogate
manager and restarts the application from the beginning (or from the most recent checkpoint, if
one exists). The surrogat e manager's notification allows the manager to notify the voter agent
in case the voter agent has a specified timeout period, or if the application has failed multiple
/
times, the surrogate manager may decide to migrate it to a different host.
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u5.4.6 Host
The FTM is the entity responsible for recovery from a host failure. When the FTM is
notified of the failure by the heartbeat agent, the failed host is deregistered from the FTM's
table of participating nodes, After deregistering the host, a message is sent to each surrogate
manager notifying it of the host failure. When a surrogate manager receives such a message, if it
determines an agent it is managing was executing on the failed host, the agent is reconstructed
and reinstalled on a new host. This reinstallation procedure is similar to the one described
above for either an execution agent or a voter agent.
The FTM may recognize that a surrogate manager was residing on the failed host. In that
case, it restores the surrogate manager on a different host using much the same method as
described above for recovery from surrogate manager failures.
5.5 An Example Failure Scenario
This section outlines an example of a failure in duplicated execution mode and the steps
taken to detect and recover from the failure. The failure shown here is a node failure that affects
the voter agent. The steps from detection of the failed host to completion of the application
are detailed below and in Figures 5.1 through 5.3.
Figure 5.1 shows the detection of the host failure by the heartbeat agent. After not receiving
a heartbeat from the host within the specified timeout period, the heartbeat agent assumes the
unresponsive node has failed. The FTM is promptly notified of the failure and removes the
host from its system configuration file.
In Figure 5.2, restarting of the agent on the failed node is portrayed. First, the FTM searches
its list of surrogate managers to determine whether the failed host was home to a surrogate
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Figure 5.1 Host failure detected by heartbeat agent.
manager. After that, the FTM notifies all of its surrogate managers of the host failure. When
a surrogate manager receives a host failure notification, it determines whether any of its agents
were located on that host. In this case, the surrogate manager notices the voter agent was
executing on the failed host. A new voter agent is created using the information the surrogate
manager maintained about the unreachable voter agent• Once the voter is ready to be deployed,
the surrogate manager requests, a new host from the FTM. After receiving information about
the host, it installs the regenerated voter agent on this new host•
Figure 5.3 shows the final step in the'recovery process. The voter agent notifies the execution
agents on whose results it will vote of its new location. Upon receiving this notification, the
execution agents modify their results destination accordingly. If the application being monitored
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Figure 5.2 Voter agent regeneration.
by the execution agent has already successfully terminated, the results are immediately sent to
the new voter agent.
5.6 Summary
Chameleon supports a number of mechanisms to detect and recover from failures of vari-
ous components. The injection, detection, and recovery strategies described above are those
that have been implemented in the simulation. All simulation results described in this thesis
incorporate the strategies outlined in this chapter.
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Figure 5.3 Execution agents notified of new voter agent.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
6.1 Overview
Using the simulation described in the previous two chapters, several simulated scenarios were
run and analyzed. The main focus of the results is on Chameleon's fault-handling capabilities.
In this chapter, the evaluated scenarios and the results obtained are discussed.
6.2 Simulation Parameters
To obtain results from the simulation, it was necessary to choose values for certain critical
parameters (Table 6.1). The link bandwidth value was measured from preliminary implementa-_
tion results using TCP/IP, not the Myrinet API. Other parameters necessary in the simulation
v
included CPU times required for various tasks, such as the time it takes a voter to compare
results, the time it takes a daemon to process a message and send it to the appropriate agent,
etc. Many of these times were taken from preliminary implementation measurements, others
were estimated.
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6.3 Scenarios Evaluated and Measurements Taken
A primary goal of these measurements was to determine the performance degradation caused
by running an application in Chameleon. Another goal was to measure the time to recover from
36
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LParameter Value
Heartbeat interval 5 s
Heartbeat timeout 20 s
Daemon monitor interval 20 s
Agent monitor interval 20 s
Link bandwidth 25KBytes/s
:=
Table 6.1 Parameters used in the simulation.
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single points of failure in various system components. A third goal was to analyze Chameleon's
capability to handle multiple simultaneous failures.
To find the performance degradation with no failures, single user requests were simulated
running in duplicated mode, TMR mode, and quad mode. Each of these scenarios was simulated
with background workloads of 0, 1.5 (two background jobs on half of the hosts, and one on the
other half), and 3.0 (three jobs on each host).
No background network traffic was simulated. In several runs of the simulation with sig-
nificant network traffic, only minimal performance degradation was noticed. The number of
background jobs running on the nodes had a much more profound effect on the time required
to execute user requests.
To measure the performance under single failures, the same three execution modes and
the same' three background workloads were used as for the measurements with no failures. In
addition, a single fault was injected during each execution of a user request. The faults were
injected into six different components: execution agents, heartbeat agents, surrogate managers,
hosts, user-applications, and voter agents. The times required to complete these user requests
were compared with the times to completion without failures. All user requests were assumed
to require 50 seconds of CPU time. The faults were injected into each component according to
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anexponentialdistributionwith a meanof 20seconds.Eachscenariowasrunwith 10different
seedsto the fault injector,and theresultswereaveraged.
To seehowwell Chameleonhandlesmultiplesimultaneousfailures,the simulationwasrun
with faultsbeinginjectedinto all components(eachinstanceof thesix componentsinjectedin
the singlefailureruns andthe FTM). Alongwith this, the simulationwasrun with two fault
injectionsdeliberatelycoincidingwith severaldifferentpairsof faults.
6.4 Analysis of Results m
This section contains the results obtained from running various simulated scenarios. The
results obtained are discussed and analyzed. Both single- and multiple-failure scenarios are
presented, as well as the performance degradation in a fault-free environment.
Table 6.2 shows the overhead required for running an application under three different fault
tolerance strategies when no faults occur. The times are compared to the actual execution
time of the application, taking the system load into consideration. The Chameleon overhead
ranges from 6.5% to 11:.8%, certainly reasonable to ensure that a critical application completes
with the correct results. Since the amount of overhead changes only slightly with the execution
time of the application, the percentage overhead should be smaller for applications requiring
more CPU time than 50 seconds. Under the same conditions with 1000-second applications,
the Chameleon overheads ranged from 2.1% to 2.8%.
:: Tabies 6. 3-t-hr0-u-gh 6:5 show the times requ-ired to recover from six d_ffereht °tyi_es of faiiure§:
for three different fault tolerance strategies. FTM failures were not considered because no
recovery mechanism for them has been modeled.
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Execution Strategy ]1 Average Load .T!me Chameleon Time II Increase
Duplicated 0 50.00s 54.06s 8.1%
Duplicated 1.5 100.00s 107138s 7.4%
Duplicated 3.0 200.00s 6.5%
TMR
TMR
TMR
Quad
Quad
Quad
0
1.5
3.0
0
1.5
3.0
50.00s
lO0.OOs
200.OOs
50.00s
100.00s
200.00s
213.00s
54.74s
108.76s
215.44s
55.89s
111.72s
218.74s
9.5%
8.8%
7.7%
11.8%
11.7%
9.4%
2:C
; 2:2_
Table 6.2 Overhead incurred by Chameleon under various loads and fault tolerance strategies.
Failed Component Average Time to Increase over [ Percent
Load Complete Fault-Free Execution [ Change
Execution Agent 0.0 81.87s 27.81s 51.4%
Execution Agent 1.5 134.09s 26.71s 24.9%
Execution Agent 3.0 237.36s 24.36s 11.4%
Surrogate Manager 0.0 54.06s 0.0s 0.0%
Surrogate Manager 1.5 109.12s 1.74s 1.6%
Surrogate Manager 3.0 219.37s 6.37s 3.0%
Voter Agent 0.0 54.22s 0.16s 0.0%
Voter Agent 1.5 107.53s 0.15s 0.0%
Voter Agent 3.0 213.16s 0.16s 0.0%
Host 0.0 76.33s 22.27s 41.2%
Host 1.5 162.82s 55.44s 51.6%
Host 3.0 232.21s 19.21s 9.0%
Heartbeat Agent 0.0 53.8-9S -0.17s 0.0%
Heartbeat Agent 1.5 107.11s -0.27s 0.0%
Heartbeat Agent 3.0 212.76s -0.24s 0.0%
Application 0.0 29.22s 54.1%
Application 1.5
Application 3.0
83.28s
136:b0s
240.66s
28.63s 26.7%
27.66s 13.0%
Table 6.3 Performance degradation caused by single failures in duplicated execution mode.
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mFor execution agent and application failures, the performance degradation includes the time
required to detect and recover from failure, as well as the time lost due to the fact that, the
application is restarted from the beginning. The results show that in the case of an execution
agent failure or an application failure, Chameleon may require approximately 50% or more extra
time to complete the application. Most of this time is due to the fact that the application must
be restarted from the beginning. If a failure occurred when an application was 99% complete,
it would take about twice as long by Chameleon to process the user request. The average time
taken for Chameleon to detect and recover from an application failure is 10.0 seconds; from an
execution agent failure, the time required is 10.8 seconds. These times were measured with no
load on the system and are constant with respect to the running time of the application. This
implies that most of the overhead is being caused by the application catching up to the point
of the failure.
In practice, overhead when there is an application or execution agent failure will average
approximately 50% of execution time. For applications requiring a large amount of CPU time,
these overheads become very large. To prevent restarting the application from the beginning,
application checkpointing could be implemented. In the event of a failure in the application or
its monitoring agent, the application could be restarted from the most recent checkpoint. As
long as_ the checkpointing interval is not too large, this would solve the problem of the recovery
time increasing With the execution time of an application.
Each set of results shows extremely minimal overhead for recovering from voter agent fail-
ures. In general, a voter agent failure should cause very little overhead. However, a failed voter
agent can cause more delay when the time between its failure and regeneration overlaps with
the completion of the application. All execution agents must stall until the voter is regener-
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Failed Component
Execution Agent
Execution Agent
Execution Agent
Surrogate Manager
Surrogate Manager
Surrogate Manager
Voter Agent
Voter Agent
Voter Agent
Average
Load
0.0
1.5
Time to
Complete
81.87s
134.09s
Increase over
Fault-Free Execution
27.13s
25.33s
Percent
Change
49.6%
3.0 237.36s 21.92s
23.3%
10.2%
0.0 54.74s O.Os 0.0%
1.5 124.26s 15.50s 14.3%
3.0 223.24s 7.80s 3.6%
54.90s
108.92s
215.60s
0.0 0.16s 0.0%
0.16s 0.0%
0.16s 0.0%
25.49s 45.6%
56.26s 50.4%
' 18.85s 8.6%
-0.I7s 0.0%
-0.27s 0.0%
-0.24s
1.5
0.0%
3.0
Host 0.0 81.38s
Host 1.5 167.98s
3.0 237.59S
0.0 53.89s
1.5 107.11s
3.0 212.76s
Host
Heartbeat Agent
Heartbeat Agent
Heartbeat Agent
Application
Application
Application
0.0 83.31s 28.57s 52.2%
1.5 136.06s 27.30s 25.1%
3.0 240.72s 25.28s 11.7%
Table 6.4 Performance degradation caused by single failures in TMR mode.
ated before sending the application results. This is a relatively uncommon occurrence, and the
overhead is fixed with respect to the application's running time.
Surrogate manager failures are similar to voter agent failures in that the overhead is minimal
except when the failure overlaps with the completion of the managed application. There is
one other exception for surrogate managers. A surrogate manager may fail during the agent
installation process. In this case, the new surrogate manager must restart the entire installation
process, since no record is kept of which agents have been installed. This could be the cause
of significant overhead, especially in applications being executed with fault tolerance strategies
requiring a large number of agents.
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FailedComponent Average
Load L_J
Host
Increase over )t PercentFault-Free Execution Change
Execution Agent 0.0 27.13s 49.6%
Execution Agent 1.5 25.33s 23.3%
Execution Agent 3.0 21.92s 10'.2%
Surrogate Manager 0.0 3.78s 6.8%
Surrogate Manager 1.5 34.28s 30.7%
Surrogate Manager 3.0 8.39s 3.8%
Voter Agent 0.0 0.02s 0.0%
Voter Agent 1.5 0.01s 0.0%
Voter Agent 3.0 0.01s 0.0%
46.6%
Host
Host
Heartbeat Agent
Heartbeat Agent
Heartbeat Agent
0.0
1.5
3.0
0:0
1.5
3.0
0.0Application
Time to
Complete
83.78s
137.38s
241.96s
59.67s
146.00s
227.13s
55.91s
111.73s
218.75s
8(.91s
158.21s
243.44s
55.71s
111.48s
218.62s
83.78s
137.38s
.... i
241.96s
26.02s
46.49s
24.70s
-0.18s
-0.24s
:0.12s
27.89s
25.66sApplication 1.5
Application 3.0 23.22s
41.6%
11.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
49.9%
23.0%
10.6%
Table 6.5 Performance degradation caused by single failures in quad mode.
It is interesting to note that in the case of a heartbeat agent failure Chameleon applications
require slightly less time to complete. This is because the host daemons do not need to process
heartbeat messages while the heartbeat agent is not alive. This decreases the number of jobs
vying for each processor slightly and allows the applications to finish a little bit more quickly.
Problems may occur when a host failure overlaps with a heartbeat agent failure. In this case the
time required to detect a host failure will markedly increase, potentially causing applications
to be stalled. This may not be realistic in the actual implementation, as the application may
be required to stall until the heartbeat agent can be recovered.
Host failures are another significant source of overhead. The average host failure takes
about the same time to detect as an agent failure because the heartbeat timeout interval is the
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same as the agent monitoring interval. Recovery time is slightly more because the surrogate
manager needs to request a new host from the FTM. The reason the results show such significant
overheads is that when a host with an execution agent on it fails, it requires more time to recover
from than an execution agent failure or a simple application failure. Again, this could be helped
by using a checkpointing scheme, as long the scheme is architecture-independent or there is
another host with the same architecture available for migrating the application.
It is not guaranteed that Chameleon is capable of recovering from multiple overlapping
failures. To test how well Chameleon fares with overlapping failures, the simulation was run
in a scenario in which all components could fail as described in the previous section. Running
100 user requests in this scenario yielded 93 completed requests. The remaining seven requests
did not complete because not enough hosts were available. No overlapping failures caused an
application to be lost.
Because the coverage of the scenario above may not have been complete, a few scenarios
were run where two failures were explicitly injected at about the same time. This resulted in
an FTM failure overlapping with a surrogate manager failure, which in turn caused the user
request to be lost. A few more runs showed that a user request will not complete in Chameleon
if an entity and its managing component fail at the same time.
Figure 6.4 shows the chain of events when an agent and its surrogate manager fail simul-
taneously. The double failure shown results in a race condition between the notification of the
execution agent failure and the regeneration of the failed surrogate manager. If the surrogate
manager is successfully restarted before the notification of the failed execution agent, the recov-
ery will be successful. If the notification of the execution agent failure arrives to the surrogate
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Figure 6.1 Simultaneous failures in an execution agent and its surrogate manager.
manager's node while the surrogate manager is down, the message is dropped and there is no
acknowledgement of the execution agent's failure.
There are a few ways of correcting this problem, but they are not ironclad, and any attempt
to design mechanisms to recover from double failures will only add to the detection and recovery
overhead. It is hoped that simultaneous failures are sufficiently rare that they need not be
considered when devising fault recovery schemes. Agents, managers, and daemons in Chameleon
are designed to be compact and simple so they can be thoroughly tested. This will help in
maintaining fault resilience and preventing such overlapping failures from occurring.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
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In this thesis, the simulation of fault injection and recovery in Chameleon, a framework
for supporting cost-effective fault tolerant computing services, was described in detail. The
simulation results have shown that Chameleon is an efficient environment for executing both
critical and noncritical applications, especially applications requiring large amounts of CPU
time.
The simulation showed that there is some room for improvement in some areas. A check-
pointing scheme could be implemented to more efficiently recover from execution agent failures
and user application failures. With such a scheme in place, the recovery overhead would no
longer be dependent on the application's running time. Chameleon is capable of recovering
from some kinds of overlapping failures. However, some overlapping failures may cause user
requests to be lost. As long as these failures are relatively rare (i.e., recovery time is very short
compared to mean time between failures for each component), it is not necessary to develop
specialrecovery mechanisms. It is believed that Chameleon components are resilient enough
for this to be unnecessary. In summary, the simulation shows that Chameleon is capable of
providing a cost--effective, reliable, networked environment.
Future simulation work may include simulating additional failure modes, such as faults in
the communications medium, transient faults in components besides the FTM, and modes other
than fail-silent. Each of these modes will provide more insight into Chameleon's fault-handling
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capabilities. In addition, various methods for detecting and recovering from failures in the FTM
(e.g., the FTM running in TMR mode) should be modeled. The FTM is the most critical piece
of Chameleon, and it should be modeled very accurately to show that a single failure to the
FTM will not be catastrophic. The effectiveness of checkpointing should be analyzed through
simulation. Checkpointing will certainly help make recovery more efficient, but it is not known
how much of an effect it will have on normal system behavior and performance. Finally, methods
for handling parallel and distributed applications submitted by a user should be analyzed.
Since it is increasingly common for user applications to be of a parallel or distributed nature,
Chameleon should be able to handle these types of requests from users as well as it handles
single-threaded applications.
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